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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 16/05/2006 Accident number: 143 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 15/10/1997 
Where it occurred: Shatory Village, 
Sarozah District, 
Paktika Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: [No date recorded] 
ID original source: none Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA 
Organisation: Name removed  
Mine/device: PMN AP blast Ground condition: dry/dusty 
grass/grazing area 
soft 
Date record created: 13/02/2004 Date  last modified: 13/02/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inconsistent statements (?) 
partner's failure to "control" (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
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Accident report 
At the time of the accident the UN MAC in Afghanistan favoured the use of two-man teams 
(usually operating a one-man drill). The two would take it in turns for one to work on 
vegetation cutting, detecting and excavation, while the other both rested and supposedly 
"controlled" his partner. 
An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made briefly 
available. The following summarises its content.  
Victim No.1 had been a deminer for three years. Victim No.2 had been a deminer for six 
months. Both victims were reported to have attended a revision course eight months before 
[despite one only having been employed for six]. Both victims had been on leave 24 days 
before. The ground at the site was described as soft agricultural land. A photograph showed 
flat land with dry clumps of grass. 
The investigators determined that a dog had indicated a reading and Victim No.1 used his 
detector at the site and got two readings 35cm apart. He marked one of the indications and 
uncovered a MK 7 AT mine. Thinking that the second reading must be a fragment, he began 
investigating it carelessly and detonated the mine. His bayonet was "lost". 
The Assistant Group Leader said the deminer reacted violently when he found the AT mine 
and the bayonet flew from his hand, landing on the PMN. 
The victim's partner (Victim No.2) said that Victim No.1 was working properly and was 
marking the cleared area prior to changing over duties when the accident occurred. 
Victim No.1 said that he was detecting and got two readings. After finding an AT mine at one 
reading he was pulling a bush from the area of the second reading when the mine went off. 
The demining group said that the victim was prodding for an AT mine located by a dog. 
When he changed position and lifted his helmet to shout "mine", he leant on his shovel in the 
uncleared area and let off a PMN. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that Victim No.1 did not mark the second detector reading 
properly and was working in a squatting position when the ground was suitable for working 
prone. They decided that the victims did not maintain the correct safety distance so two were 
injured by one blast, and that they were not wearing their helmets when the accident 
occurred. As a result they decided that the team Sub-Commander had allowed the deminers 
to ignore correct procedure (the Group Leader was sick on the day so only his assistant was 
on duty). They also commented that the survey map of the site made no mention of the 
presence of AP mines. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that readings must always be marked properly before 
starting an investigation, that deminers must always wear the helmet when investigating a 
reading, and that the safety distance between members of a breaching party must be 
maintained. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 184 Name: Name removed 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
2 
Protection issued: Helmet 
Thin, short visor 
Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Eyes 
severe Face 
severe Fingers 
COMMENT 
See medical report. 
 
Medical report 
Victim No.1's injuries were summarised as: serious injuries to eyes, face, fingers.  
An insurance claim was submitted on 12th March 1998, saying that the victim had been 
"blinded" in a mine accident. 
No record on a compensation payment was found in June 1998.  
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because it is likely 
that Victim No.1 was working carelessly and his errors went uncorrected. The proximity of 
Victim No.2 to the blast should also have been corrected. The fact that neither victim was 
wearing their helmet and visor would have been obvious to any observer, from which I infer 
that field supervision was absent. The demining group's summary of the accident to the 
insurers implies a carelessness about detail that should have been corrected. 
It is possible that visors were not worn because they were too damaged to see through 
properly (as was seen frequently during field visits in 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to 
provide useable equipment may represent a serious management failing.  
The use of a squatting position to "excavate" was in breach of UN requirements, but not in 
breach of the demining group's unauthorised variations to those requirements.  The failure of 
the UN MAC to either listen to field feedback and adapt the SOP for local conditions, or 
enforce their own standards may be seen as a further management failing. 
The agency that was used to make investigations for the UN MAC (based in Pakistan) at this 
time was frequently constrained by lack of funds, staff and transport. At times their movement 
was constrained by safety concerns. As a result, investigations were frequently delayed by 
weeks, meaning that an assessment of the site at the time of the accident was impossible.  
Gathering of further accident and medical treatment detail was prevented by the UN 
programme manager who denied all access to records in September 1999. Access has 
continued to be denied up to the date of completion of this version of the database. 
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